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What the New Deal Settled
Jamal Greene†
Introduction
Not since George H.W. Bush banned it from the menu of Air Force One1
has broccoli received as much attention as it has during the legal and political
debate over the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“ACA”).2 Opponents
of the ACA have forcefully and repeatedly argued that if Congress has the power
under the Commerce Clause to require Americans to purchase health insurance as
a means of reducing health care costs, then it likewise has the power to require
Americans to eat broccoli. Judge Roger Vinson made precisely that argument in
his opinion invalidating the ACA’s minimum coverage provision, also known as
the individual mandate: accepting the government’s position, he wrote, meant that
Congress “could require that people buy and consume broccoli at regular intervals,
not only because the required purchases will positively impact interstate
commerce, but also because people who eat healthier tend to be healthier, and are
thus more productive and put less of a strain on the health care system.”3
The obvious response to this parade of horrible is that, presumptively,
neither Congress nor any state may require anyone to consume anything. 4 Justice
Frankfurter wrote for the Supreme Court sixty years ago that forcible extraction of
the contents of a criminal suspect’s stomach via an emetic solution “shocks the
conscience” and therefore violates the Due Process Clause. 5 It would seem to
follow a fortiori that force-feeding broccoli to an otherwise sui juris person
suspected of nothing but an aversion to eating broccoli would also violate either
the Fifth or the Fourteenth Amendment, depending on whether the force-feeders
were federal or state officials. A reasonably competent 1L could recite the
Socratic dialogue that one would ordinarily expect to follow this observation: it
would explore the degree to which forcible purchase of health insurance is or is
†

Associate Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. Thanks to symposium participants at the
University of Pennsylvania Law School and to participants at the New York City Junior Faculty
Workshop for helpful suggestions. Daniel Bregman and Melissa Lerner provided excellent
research assistance.
1
See AP, Broccoli off Bush’s Table, CHIC. TRIB., Mar. 18, 1990, at 3.
2
Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
3
Florida v. Dep’t Health & Hum. Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1289 (N.D. Fla. 2011).
4
Cf. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (upholding a compulsory vaccination
program).
5
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952); see also Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health,
497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990) (recognizing that “a competent person has a constitutionally protected
liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment”).
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not like forcible consumption of food. The discourse would, in other words, test
the limits of substantive due process rather than the limits of Article I.
And yet the legal and political discourse surrounding the ACA has not
taken this form. Litigation over the individual mandate has focused on the limits
of congressional power embodied within Article I of the Constitution, specifically
the Commerce Clause and the General Welfare Clause. Challengers to the
mandate generally have either avoided due process arguments entirely or given
them rote, superficial attention, and judges deciding these cases have followed
suit. This litigation choice would make sense if the Article I argument were
obviously stronger than the due process argument. But that is not at all obvious, or
at least it was not obvious at the start of the litigation. As Part I demonstrates,
based on Supreme Court precedent at the time of the ACA’s passage the Article I
argument bordered on frivolous whereas the due process argument had, and still
has, no “all-fours” doctrinal obstacles.6
Part II proposes and evaluates a competing set of broadly political reasons
for the litigation choice in these cases. Advancing a substantive due process
argument would require opponents of the individual mandate and their financial
sponsors to oppose the similar state-level mandate that Mitt Romney signed into
law as governor of Massachusetts. A libertarian objection to the individual
mandate would also threaten to rend the fragile coalition between libertarians and
social conservatives that is essential to the vitality of the Tea Party and that ties
many Tea Party members to the Republican Party. Finally, and relatedly,
opponents of the mandate may be reluctant to affiliate their arguments with the
Court’s reproductive freedom precedents, as reliance on substantive due process
would inevitably invite. The most powerful argument against a health insurance
purchasing mandate is that it would interfere with an individual’s deeply personal
“right to choose” how to allocate health care resources.
An additional, non-exclusive set of reasons is neither political nor, in a
narrow sense, doctrinal, but relates to the sociology of American constitutional
argument. As Part III discusses, a substantive due process claim would constitute
an argument in favor of “economic” due process, a class of arguments associated
with Lochner v. New York7 and considered verboten in the wake of the so-called
New Deal settlement. The status of Lochner as an anticanonical case forecloses
constitutional arguments well out of proportion to its doctrinal significance
6

It is useful to clarify the sense in which I believe the Commerce Clause argument is “frivolous.”
I do not mean to say that an attorney advancing such an argument risks Rule 11 sanctions or even
that a judge accepting such a claim would be doing so ultra vires the Constitution. What I mean,
rather, is that the argument is in the nature of ipse dixit: a computer equipped with all of the
Supreme Court’s precedents and programmed to extrapolate reasonably from those precedents to
new sets of facts would be quite unlikely to invalidate the individual mandate as exceeding
Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause.
7
198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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narrowly construed. Thus, even as the New Deal settlement is said to condemn in
equal measure limits on congressional power and forms of economic due process,
Lochner’s embodiment of the latter contributes to what in practical terms is a
much more profound repudiation.
Lochner, then, distorts constitutional argument by stopping economic due
process in its tracks. It does so not because such arguments were more forcefully
rejected than Article I arguments grounded in cases like Hammer v. Dagenhart8
but rather because the Due Process Clause is and has been more contested and
jurisgenerative than the Commerce Clause. Lochnerism was inaugurated because
of the fecundity of Lochner’s libertarianism, not the magnitude of its doctrinal
errors. Ironically, then, the cottage industry in Lochner revisionism derives from
the same source as the juridical need to repudiate the decision.
I
As of March 2012, twenty-two federal court complaints had been filed
challenging the constitutionality of the individual mandate.9 Of those twenty-two
8

247 U.S. 251 (1918).
Challenges to the Affordable Care Act are summarized at aca litigation blog,
http://acalitigationblog.blogspot.com. The complaints in cases challenging the constitutionality of
the individual mandate are: Second Amended Complaint, Florida v. U.S. Dept. of Health &
Human Svcs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1307 (N.D. Fl. Mar. 3, 2011) (No. 10 Civ. 91); Complaint, Thomas
More Law Center v. Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d 882 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (No. 10 Civ. 11156); Second
Amended Complaint, Liberty University v. Geithner, 753 F. Supp. 2d 611 (W.D. Va. 2010) (No.
10 Civ. 15); Complaint, Virginia v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768 (E.D. Va. 2010) (No. 10 Civ.
188); First Amended Complaint, Seven-Sky v. Holder, No. 10 Civ. 950 (D.D.C. July 2, 2010);
Amended Complaint, Kinder v. Geithner, 2011 WL 1576721 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 26, 2011) (No. 10
Civ. 101); Second Amended Complaint, U.S. Citizens Ass’n v. Sebelius, 2011 WL 3200242 (N.D.
Ohio July 1, 2011) (No. 10 Civ. 1065); Complaint, Goudy-Bachman v. U.S. Dept. of Health &
Human Svcs., 811 F. Supp. 2d 1086 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 13, 2011) (No. 10 Civ. 763); Complaint,
Sissel v. U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Svcs., No. 10 Civ. 1263 (D.D.C. July 26, 2010); Second
Amended Complaint, Coons v. Geithner, No. 10 Civ. 1714 (D. Ariz. May 10, 2011); Complaint,
Pruitt v. Sebelius, No. 11 Civ. 30 (E.D. Okla. Jan. 24, 2011); Second Amended Complaint,
Walters v. Holder, No. 10 Civ. 76 (S.D. Miss. Mar. 4, 2011); First Amended Complaint at 24,
Calvey v. Obama, 792 F. Supp. 2d 1262 (W.D. Okla. Apr. 26, 2011) (No. 10 Civ. 353); Second
Amended Complaint, Ass’n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons v. Sebelius, No. 10 Civ. 499 (D.D.C.
Sept. 14, 2010); Complaint, Boyle v. Sebelius, No. 11 Civ. 7868 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2011); First
Amended Complaint, N.J. Physicians Inc. v. Obama, 653 F.3d 234 (3rd Cir. Aug. 3, 2011) (No. 10
Civ. 1489) (D.N.J. Mar. 30, 2010); First Amended Complaint, Baldwin v. Sebelius, 2012 WL
294466 (slip op.) (S.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2012) (No. 10 Civ. 1033); Complaint, Purpura v. Sebelius,
2011 WL 1547768 (slip op.) (D.N.J. Apr. 21, 2011) (No. 10 Civ. 4814); Complaint, Burlsworth v.
Holder, No. 10 Civ. 258 (E.D. Ark. Apr. 27, 2010); Complaint, Bellow v. U.S. Dept. of Health &
Human Svcs., 2011 WL 2462205 (E.D. Tex. June 20, 2011) (No. 10 Civ. 165); Amended
Complaint, Peterson v. United States, 774 F. Supp. 2d 418 (D.N.H. Mar. 30, 2011) (No. 10 Civ.
170); Complaint, Indep. Am. Party of Nevada v. Obama, No. 10 Civ. 1477 (D. Nev. Aug. 31,
9
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complaints, only eleven argued that the mandate to purchase health insurance
violated the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. 10 Only four of those
eleven complaints alleged a due process claim in the first four counts, and none
alleged it in count one. Just one district court opinion and no court of appeals
opinions have addressed the merits of these substantive due process claims. The
one opinion to reach the argument rejected it as foreclosed by Lochner and its
progeny and the claim was subsequently abandoned on appeal. By contrast, the
Supreme Court divided sharply over whether the individual mandate exceeded
Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause.
In light of these outcomes, there is every reason to believe that focusing on
federal constitutional limits internal rather than external to the Commerce Clause
was correct as a matter of litigation strategy. This article does not challenge
whether that strategy was correct but seeks to explore why it was correct.11 The
doctrinal obstacles to invalidation of the individual mandate under the Commerce
Clause are well stated elsewhere and we need not long linger on the case here. In
brief, Congress validly legislates pursuant to the Commerce Clause when it
regulates the channels of commerce, the instrumentalities of commerce, or
economic activities having substantial effects on interstate commerce. 12 Congress
may also target non-economic activity that it reasonably believes must be
2010); Complaint, Fountain Hills Tea Party Patriots v. Sebelius, No. 10 Civ. 893 (D. Ariz. Apr. 23,
2010).
10
First Amended Complaint at 24, Second Amended Complaint, Florida v. U.S. Dept. of Health &
Human Svcs., 716 F. Supp. 2d 1120 (N.D. Fla. Oct. 14, 2010); Complaint at 14, Thomas More
Law Center v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529 (6th Cir. June 29, 2011) (No. 10-2388, No. 10 Civ. 11156)
(E.D. Mich. Mar. 23, 2010); Amended Complaint at 46–55, Kinder v. Geithner, 2011 WL
1576721 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 26, 2011) (No. 10 Civ. 101); Second Amended Complaint at 19–20, U.S.
Citizens Ass’n v. Sebelius, 2011 WL 3200242 (N.D. Ohio July 1, 2011) (No. 10 Civ. 1065);
Second Amended Complaint at 20, 22, Coons v. Geithner, No. 10 Civ. 1714 (D. Ariz. May 10,
2011); Second Amended Complaint at 34, 35, Walters v. Holder, No. 10 Civ. 76 (S.D. Miss. Mar.
4, 2011); First Amended Complaint at 24, Calvey v. Obama, 792 F. Supp. 2d 1262 (W.D. Okla.
Apr. 26, 2011) (No. 10 Civ. 353); Complaint at 91–94, Boyle v. Sebelius, No. 11 Civ. 7868 (C.D.
Cal. Sept. 22, 2011); First Amended Complaint at 9, N.J. Physicians Inc. v. Obama, 653 F.3d 234
(3rd Cir. Aug. 3, 2011) (No. 10 Civ. 1489) (D.N.J. Mar. 30, 2010); First Amended Complaint at
30, Baldwin v. Sebelius, 2012 WL 294466 (slip op.) (Jan. 31, 2012) (No. 10 Civ. 1033);
Complaint at 43, Indep. Am. Party of Nevada v. Obama, No. 10 Civ. 1477 (D. Nev. Aug. 31,
2010).
11
Nor have I any quarrel, as a general matter, with legal advocates’ advancing novel constitutional
arguments. It does seem to be incumbent upon the Supreme Court to exercise caution in adopting
such arguments, particularly when reviewing landmark congressional statutes drafted, debated,
and passed in reliance on a well-settled legal framework. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S.
507, 536 (1997) (“When the political branches of the Government act against the background of a
judicial interpretation of the Constitution already issued, it must be understood that in later cases
and controversies the Court will treat its precedents with the respect due them under settled
principles, including stare decisis, and contrary expectations must be disappointed.”).
12
See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 16-17 (2005).
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regulated in order to ensure the effectiveness of a broader regulatory scheme that
substantially affects interstate commerce.13
The ACA regulates activities having substantial effects on interstate
commerce in at least two ways. First, and most directly, it regulates the decision
to self-insure rather than to purchase health insurance on the open market.
Because medical expenses are unpredictable, many who choose to self-insure
cannot ultimately afford to do so. Extant legal and social norms require that
emergency medical care be provided to individuals regardless of ability to pay,
and the cost of providing that care is passed on in the form of higher premiums to
those who pay for health insurance. 14 Individuals who self-insure are also
substantially less likely to seek preventive care, and so when they do receive care
it is disproportionately costly.15 No one in the litigation before the Supreme Court
denied that self-insurance has substantial effects on interstate commerce. The crux
of the challengers’ argument, rather, was that self-insurance is not economic
activity. If that claim does not carry its own refutation, one need look no further
than the Court’s decision in Wickard v. Filburn,16 in which a farmer’s decision
not to enter the wheat market was validly subject to regulation on the ground that
his decision, aggregated with others similarly situated, substantially affected the
price of wheat.17 Or to the Court’s more recent decision in Gonzales v. Raich, in
which a marijuana grower’s decision not to enter the commercial marketplace did
not exempt her from the reach of federal criminal laws justified under the
commerce power precisely because “leaving home-consumed marijuana outside
federal control would . . . affect price and market conditions.”18
Neither United States v. Lopez19 nor United States v. Morrison,20 the two
Rehnquist Court precedents imposing internal constitutional limitations on the
reach of the Commerce Clause, implicates any of the above reasoning. The Gun
Free School Zones Act, which was invalidated in Lopez, sought to regulate
possession of a gun near a school, which is neither an economic activity itself nor
an essential component of any existing and constitutionally valid regulatory
program.21 The federal civil remedy for victims of gender-motivated violence that
the Court struck down in Morrison did not itself target economic activity and was

13

See id. at 18–19.
See Liberty Univ. v. Geithner, 671 F.3d 391, at *135 (4th Cir. 2011) (Davis, J., dissenting).
15
See Mead v. Holder, 766 F. Supp. 2d 16, 35 (D.D.C 2011).
16
317 U.S. 111 (1942).
17
See id. at 127–28.
18
Raich, 545 U.S. at 19. See also Katzenbach v. McClung 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (holding that,
acting through its commerce powers, Congress could require restaurants to serve black customers).
19
514 U.S. 549 (1995).
20
529 U.S. 598 (2000).
21
See Raich, 545 U.S. at 23.
14
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not connected in any direct way to regulation of a commercial market.22 One need
not repudiate either case in order to believe that Congress was on firm
constitutional ground in including an individual mandate as part of the ACA; it is
therefore simply untrue that this particular rationale presumes unlimited federal
power.23
There is a second, independent way in which the ACA may (indeed, must)
be described as a regulation of activity with substantial effects on interstate
commerce. The Act is designed, among other things, to prevent insurance carriers
from discriminating on the basis of preexisting medical conditions to a degree that
makes the purchase of insurance cost-prohibitive.24 It is, in this sense, a regulation
of the market for health insurance. Again, no one in the litigation before the
Supreme Court denied, nor could plausibly deny, that an insurer’s refusing
coverage or raising prices on the basis of preexisting conditions is an economic
activity substantially affecting interstate commerce.25 The individual mandate is
included within the statute because it is financially infeasible to restrict preexisting condition discrimination without substantially broadening the pool of the
insured to include people who are unlikely to become extremely sick in the near
future. From this perspective, the individual mandate is justified as a means of
making Congress’s concededly valid regulatory scheme effective.
McCulloch v. Maryland announces the rule governing the scope of
Congress’s choice of means to effect its constitutionally valid ends: “Let the end
be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which
are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited,
but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.”26 The
Court reiterated in a much more recent case, United States v. Comstock,27 that
Congress may choose any means “that is rationally related to the implementation
of a constitutionally enumerated power.”28 Comstock upheld the authority of the
federal government to confine federal inmates classified as mentally ill and
“sexually dangerous” beyond their terms of imprisonment where their state of
domicile or trial refuses to assume custody.29 The Court upheld this practice on
the grounds that confinement of such persons helps to ensure the safety of
communities surrounding prisons, which are themselves rationally related to the
22

See id. at 25.
See Neil S. Siegel, Four Constitutional Limits That the Minimum Coverage Provision Respects,
27 CONST. COMM. 591, 598 (2011).
24
See 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg (a).
25
See United States v. Se. Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 539–40 (1944) (“The modern
insurance business . . . has become one of the largest and most important branches of commerce.”).
26
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 421 (1819).
27
130 S. Ct. 1949 (2010).
28
Id. at 1956.
29
Id. at 1954–55.
23
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existence of federal crimes, which are themselves rationally related to the
Congress’s substantive enumerated regulatory powers (including the power to
regulate interstate commerce).30 The link between the individual mandate and the
regulation of preexisting condition discrimination in the health insurance industry
is much shorter and much tighter than the link upheld in Comstock eight weeks
after the ACA was signed into law.
Congress’s power under the Necessary and Proper Clause is not unlimited,
of course, and it is the absence of obvious limits that animates much of the ACA
litigation. 31 But Comstock addressed this objection by referring to the limits
embedded within substantive enumerated powers and within other provisions of
the Constitution. 32 The reach of the Necessary and Proper Clause itself is left
“primarily . . . to the judgment of Congress,”33 and certainly does not preclude
federal regulation of a decision not to do something. Consider, for example, the
decision not to file a tax return, or not to register for Selective Service, or not to
report for federal jury duty.34 And so the Necessary and Proper Clause inquiry
30

See id. at 1958.
A brief additional word on broccoli and related objections is irresistible. The most powerful
“limiting principle” that prevents a federal broccoli mandate is neither any specific legal doctrinal
principle nor the principle of political accountability as such. Cf. Herbert Wechsler, The Political
Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National
Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954). It is more precisely what we might call a principle of
social membership. It is not that any member of Congress supporting a broccoli mandate would be
voted out of office—this kind of political accountability story is premised, implicitly, on the
vaguely conspiratorial notion that members of Congress would enact tyrannical regulations (for
their own sake?) if left unchecked by their constituents. The more direct explanation for members
of Congress not seeking to enact tyrannical regulations is that they do not support them. A society
in which the broccoli objection counts as a slippery slope argument is one whose elected officials
are quite unlikely to support a broccoli mandate. It follows that we cannot actually count on such
officials being voted out of office for supporting the mandate because the society in which such
support was possible would not find the mandate self-evidently unacceptable.
32
Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1957.
33
Id. at 1957 (quoting Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 547–48 (1934)).
34
One distinction between failing to file a tax return and failing to purchase health insurance is
that the former is regulated only if the person engages in certain prerequisite activities, namely
earning a specified amount of income, whereas under the ACA the latter is not (or so some have
claimed). There are a number of responses to this objection. First, the ACA penalty does not in
fact apply to everyone who fails to purchase health insurance, only those who meet certain income
requirements and are not otherwise exempt, for example, for religious reasons. Cite. Second, it is
not at all clear why either the Necessary and Proper Clause or the Sixteenth Amendment would
prevent the government from requiring all Americans to file a tax return regardless of whether
they earned any income. Third, even if either of the first two responses were unavailing, it is
difficult to imagine why constitutional significance should attach to the distinction between
requiring someone to do something by virtue of being human and requiring her to do it only if she
earns income or engages in some other activity essential to one’s livelihood. Fourth, because
virtually all humans must at some point finance the costs of medical care, and because those costs
31
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either returns us to the Commerce Clause itself or refers us to independent
constitutional limitations on congressional power, two of which I discuss below.
Note, though, that when we frame the internal Commerce Clause inquiry in terms
of regulating preexisting condition discrimination, the concern over regulation of
inactivity disappears, because it is indisputable that pricing health insurance
policies is an economic activity that substantially affects interstate commerce.
The doctrinal explanations just described, in addition to others I have
reserved,35 have led several prominent constitutional scholars to conclude that the
challengers’ Article I arguments are frivolous. Akhil Amar has compared Judge
Vinson’s opinion invalidating the individual mandate to Roger Taney’s opinion in
Dred Scott v. Sandford.36 Andrew Koppelman has described the arguments for the
constitutionality of the individual mandate as “obvious” and the objections as
“sill[y],” writing that “no one had heard of [the action/inaction distinction] until
the mandate's opponents invented it.”37 Charles Fried has called the notion that
Congress is impermissibly forcing people into the health insurance market “a
canard that’s been invented by the tea party and Randy Barnetts of the world,”
adding that he was “astonished to hear it coming out of the mouths of the people
on [the Supreme Court].”38
So much for the constitutional objections to the individual mandate that
are native to the Commerce Clause or the Necessary and Proper Clause. The
challengers might yet have a case grounded in limitations external to Article I.
One possible restriction on congressional power to require Americans to purchase
health insurance might be the Tenth Amendment. The Tenth Amendment has
historically been invoked to support the existence of residual sovereign power

are radically unpredictable, the market for health insurance is quite unlike most other markets, and
so may easily justify sui generis regulatory strategies. Finally, the distinction does not apply to the
failure to register for Selective Service or to report for jury duty, regulatory requirements that are
also justified, if at all, under the Necessary and Proper Clause.
35
For example, many scholars are persuaded that Congress’s taxing power is sufficient to justify
the individual mandate, which is enforced solely by the Internal Revenue Service and whose
provisions are contained within the Internal Revenue Code. See Brief of Constitutional Law
Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Defendant-Appellant, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. v.
Florida, 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011) (No. 11-11021). The metes and bounds of this argument
exceed the scope of this article.
36
Akhil Reed Amar, Op-Ed, Constitutional Showdown: A Florida Judge Distorted the Law in
Striking Down Healthcare Reform, Feb. 6, 2011, at 25.
37
Andrew Koppelman, Bad News for Mail Robbers: The Obvious Constitutionality of Health Care
Reform, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 1, 20 n.93, 23 (2011).
38
Ezra Klein, Reagan’s Solicitor General: ‘Health Care Is Interstate Commerce. Is This
Regulation of It? Yes. End of Story, WONKBLOG, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ezraklein/post/reagans-solicitor-general-health-care-is-interstate-commerce-is-this-a-regulation-of-ityes-end-of-story/2011/08/25/gIQAmaQigS_blog.html.
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retained by state governments.39 Thus, the Court discussed the Tenth Amendment
in holding that the federal government may not require state law enforcement
officers to conduct background checks on purchasers of handguns under the
Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act even if, under the Act, it could do so
itself or could require private gun dealers to do so. 40 The text of the Tenth
Amendment is not, however, limited to protecting state prerogatives. It reads:
“The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited
by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”41
Challengers to the ACA have relied on this language to argue that, just as the right
to control the actions of state police officers is inherent in state sovereignty, an
individual’s capacity over health care financing is inherent in individual
autonomy and cannot be infringed by the federal government even acting
pursuant to otherwise legitimate authority.42
Let us assume for the sake of argument (and only for its sake) 43 that “the
people” as used in the Tenth Amendment refers to individuals rather than a
broader body politic. On that assumption, which is required to make sense of the
claim, the presence of this novel argument in the ACA litigation makes even more
urgent the question animating this article. We have a name for powers reserved to
individuals and not delegated to government: they’re called rights, and the
Constitution has a great deal to say about them. But rather than argue in a
straightforward way that the individual mandate infringes on rights protected by
the Fifth Amendment or some other obviously rights-sensitive constitutional
provision, challengers to the mandate have embedded their rights claims in
roundabout arguments about federalism. There is no case holding, even remotely,
that either the constitutional structure or the Tenth Amendment itself prevents the
federal government from conscripting individuals into acting against their will to
accomplish some federal regulatory objective. It makes sense that this would be
so given that the Court’s rights jurisprudence is substantial and available to serve
arguments of just this sort. If someone has no right against compelled purchase of
39

See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935–36 (1997) (O’Connnor, J., concurring); id. at 936
(Thomas, J., concurring); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713–14 (1999); New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144, 155–57 (1992); National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 842–43
(1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Trans. Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 531 (1985);
Hammer, 247 U.S. at 274, overruled by United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 116–17 (1941); see
generally U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 848–57 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
40
See Printz, 521 U.S. at 919.
41
U.S. Const. amend. X (emphasis added).
42
See Brief for Private Plaintiffs-Appellees National Federation of Independent Business, Kaj
Ahlburg, and Mary Brown at 46–49, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. v. Florida, 648 F.3d 1235
(11th Cir. 2011) (No. 11-11021).
43
See, e.g., Kurt T. Lash, The Inescapable Federalism of the Ninth Amendment, 93 IOWA L. REV.
801, 825 (2008) (“Prior to the adoption of the Federal Constitution, the term ‘the people’ referred
to the collective sovereign entity of the citizens of a given state.”).
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health insurance, it difficult to understand why the federal government may not
compel that purchase when acting pursuant to otherwise legitimate powers.44
Challenging the individual mandate primarily on federalism grounds
would yet make strategic sense if it were abundantly clear that there is indeed no
constitutional right against compelled purchase of health insurance. I am not
inclined to argue, doctrinally or otherwise, for the existence of such a right, but
unlike with the Article I argument discussed above, precedent does not foreclose
the possibility entirely. Let us begin, as we must, with Lochner. Judge Vinson
dismissed the substantive due process claim by referring to the Lochner era:
“[T]his claim would have found Constitutional support in the Supreme Court’s
decisions in the years prior to the New Deal legislation of the mid-1930’s, when
the Due Process Clause was interpreted to reach economic rights and liberties.”45
According to Judge Vinson, the right claimed by the challengers was a form of
economic substantive due process, which the rejection of Lochner forecloses.
A puzzle arises immediately. In rejecting the due process claim, Judge
Vinson cited an Eleventh Circuit case stating the proposition that “a searching
inquiry into the validity of legislative judgments concerning economic regulation
is not required.” 46 That is, the substantive due process claim fails because the
legislative scheme counts as economic regulation but the Commerce Clause claim
fails because it does not count as economic regulation. One gets the distinct
impression that either a bad argument has been disguised as a good one or vice
versa.
It is certainly true that anyone making an argument that may reasonably be
styled as economic substantive due process is on rough constitutional terrain. But
it is not true that any government regulation of economic transactions is, for that
reason alone, immune from substantive due process attack. The Supreme Court
held in Carey v. Population Services International that the State of New York
could not restrict the retail distribution of contraceptives to sales by licensed
pharmacists. 47 The Court applied strict scrutiny to the regulation, because “the
same test must be applied to state regulations that burden an individual’s right to
decide to prevent conception or terminate pregnancy by substantially limiting
access to the means of effectuating that decision as is applied to state statutes that
prohibit the decision entirely.”48 The lesson of the case, affirmed by Buckley v.
Valeo 49 and its progeny, 50 is that restrictions on financial activity cannot be
44
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evaluated in a vacuum but must be considered in light of the interests to which the
activity is instrumental. Government presumptively may not burden fundamental
rights, and burdens occasioned by commercial regulation are no exception.
The appropriate framing question is not, then, whether the government is
regulating an economic transaction but whether, in doing so, the government is
infringing upon a fundamental right. Whether or not there is a fundamental right
to self-insure for health care cannot be answered by staring harder at the text of
Lochner. A sympathetic rendering of the ACA claim would compare it to the case
in which, rather than restricting the ability of bakers to contract to work more than
60 hours per week, the New York legislature had instead restricted the ability of
bakers to contract to work fewer than 60 hours a week. Putting aside Thirteenth
Amendment concerns, Lochner is surely not sufficient to reject a substantive due
process challenge to such a law.
A far more germane precedent is Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 51 decided
three days before Lochner was argued. The Jacobson Court upheld a compulsory
smallpox vaccination program in Massachusetts against a due process challenge.
If the government may, consistent with the Due Process Clause, require its
citizens to take a potentially dangerous vaccine (in the Lochner era, no less!), then
may it not a fortiori require its solvent citizens to purchase health insurance?52
Not necessarily. First, the state interest in a mandatory vaccination program for a
deadly and contagious illness might reasonably (though not inevitably) be
described as more compelling than the interest in preventing either pre-existing
condition discrimination by insurers or free-riding and cost-shifting by health care
consumers. Second, Jacobson indeed precedes the effective rejection of Lochner
in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 53 but it also precedes the revitalization of
substantive due process in Griswold v. Connecticut. 54 And Griswold and its
progeny are concerned precisely with an individual’s autonomy over private
decisionmaking. Under the modern Due Process Clause, a woman has a
presumptive constitutional right to determine whether to bear or beget a child,55
an individual has both the right to bodily integrity 56 and the right to refuse
unwanted medical treatment, 57 and even a prisoner has a “significant liberty
interest” in not being administered antipsychotic drugs against his will.58 A panel
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of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held that this line of cases
supported a constitutionally protected right to receive potentially life-saving
experimental drugs.59
This series of cases has led Abigail Moncrieff to identify a constitutional
“freedom of health” that includes “a freedom to reject unwanted medical care and
implicitly . . . a freedom to obtain at least certain kinds of medical care.” 60 If such
a liberty interest indeed exists and is sufficient to warrant heightened
constitutional scrutiny, then the argument that the government may not compel
the purchase of health insurance becomes more colorable. Moncrieff argues that
the individual mandate raises constitutional questions because it effectively
requires consumers to pay for care through a system that interposes a third-party
auditor between the consumer and their physician’s health care choices. 61 More
broadly, a right to direct one’s own medical care might reasonably be threatened
by a system that requires limited funds to be spent on health insurance rather than
saved for future care insofar as it uses the consumer’s own finances to alter the
costs and benefits of particular care options. Routine and preventive care,
rationally avoided in the absence of the mandate, is made a moral hazard under
the ACA.62
Moncrieff ultimately concludes that to the extent there is a presumptive
constitutional objection to the individual mandate grounded in the freedom of
health, the presumption of unconstitutionality is overcome by a sufficiently
compelling governmental interest and the narrow tailoring of the individual
mandate’s remedial scheme.63 I agree, and I am less certain than Moncrieff that
the most reasonable interpretation of the Court’s cases supports a broad “freedom
of health.” The important point, however, is not whether I believe the substantive
due process argument is a loser, but why virtually everyone of consequence in the
massive litigation over the ACA appears to hold the same view, even as many of
those same people are unmoved by seemingly persuasive defenses of
congressional power under Article I.
In different terms, we may identify the litigation choices in this case, and
the judicial responses to those choices, as emblematic of an aggressive, but
distinctly partial, unsettling of the New Deal settlement. As Larry Kramer writes,
the New Deal settlement entailed “the Court restor[ing] to politics questions
respecting the definition or scope of the powers delegated by the Constitution to
59
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Congress and the Executive, subject only to a very limited rational basis
scrutiny.”64 As indicated by footnote four of United States v. Carolene Products,65
it also entailed “more exacting scrutiny” for certain individual rights66 but not for
others, namely those represented by Lochner and falling generally under the
category of economic and social rights. 67 The ACA litigation places the twin
pillars of the New Deal settlement in sharp relief, and pulls them apart. Under the
settlement, both the Article I and the substantive due process claims against the
individual mandate should be off limits. In reality, only one is.
II
It is possible to tell a reasonably powerful but wholly extralegal story
about the paucity of substantive due process claims in this litigation and in its
surrounding discourse. Like many good stories, it begins where the money trail
ends.
Consider the following. The litigation immediately before the Court in
Florida v. Department of Health and Human Services was brought by 26 states,68
two private plaintiffs, and the National Federation of Independent Business
(NFIB). The NFIB is a business lobbying organization funded in part by the
Claude R. Lambe Charitable Foundation, which is controlled by Charles G.
Koch.69 Koch’s brother David endorsed Mitt Romney for President in 2008 and
hosted a major fundraiser in the Hamptons for Romney in 2010.70 The Kochs’
brother Bill and his coal company, Oxbow Carbon, donated $1 million to
Romney’s Super PAC, Restore Our Future, in 2011.71 David and Charles Koch
are co-founders of and have donated more than $1 million to Americans for
Prosperity, among the most significant financial and logistical backers of the Tea
Party movement. 72 All of the plaintiffs, including the states, have been
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represented throughout the litigation by David Rivkin and Lee Casey of Baker &
Hostetler. Rivkin and Casey were legal advisors to Romney on his justice
advisory committee throughout the primary season and remain two of his most
high-profile supporters within the legal community.73
In other words, the litigation against the ACA has been funded in
significant part by a network of elite Republicans committed to Mitt Romney’s
presidential aspirations and to the sustenance of the Tea Party movement. If the
individual mandate violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause then it
also violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. 74 A successful
substantive due process argument against the individual mandate would therefore
mean that the only other American executive to sign such a mandate into law,
Mitt Romney, would have supported equally unconstitutional health care
legislation. Significant litigation backed by establishment Republicans and
premised on the unconstitutionality of Romney’s signature legislative
achievement would have been deeply threatening to Romney’s Republican
primary prospects and, therefore, to the possibility of a Republican victory in the
2012 presidential election. Threading the federalism needle would be a rational
strategy for anyone with this suggested set of priorities.
Quite apart from Romney’s presidential prospects, the link between the
Tea Party movement and the Republican Party, so vital to Republican political
energy in 2010, has depended on tempering the Tea Party’s fundamentalist
libertarian elements and supporting its anti-Washington impulses. As has been
well-documented,75 the modern Republican Party comprises a tenuous coalition of
economic and social conservatives, the result of William F. Buckley’s famous
“fusion” strategy. Libertarianism that takes the form of anti-regulatory zeal
directed at Congress is harmonious with that fusion whereas a purer form of antistatist libertarianism is threatening to it. Tea Party supporters appear to be divided
between libertarians on one hand and fiscal and social conservatives on the other.
Based on extensive survey research conducted during the fall of 2010, Emily
Ekins concludes that “[t]he Tea Party seems unified on role of government
questions regarding economics and business; however, they are roughly split in
half about the government promoting a particular set of values.” 76 That is,
libertarians within the Tea Party align with Democrats on social and cultural
issues but align with Republicans on economic issues. Conservatives within the
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Tea Party align with Republicans on both sets of issues.77 Challenging the ACA
as an overreach by Washington can be supported not only by establishment
Republicans but also by both wings of the Tea Party, whereas challenging the
ACA as more generally statist threatens to split significant elements of the Tea
Party from the Republican mainstream.
Relatedly, the unity of the Republican coalition requires official
opposition to abortion rights. Pro-abortion rights Republican politicians, once
common, are nearly extinct, and hostility to Roe v. Wade remains the most
significant, if at times sub rosa, litmus test for Republican judges. An integrated
political and legal strategy for overturning the ACA must, like any strategy that
relies on mass conservative mobilization, be compatible with Roe’s incorrectness.
But it is difficult to conceive of a competent legal brief advocating invalidation of
the individual mandate on due process grounds that does not rely on Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 78 which affirmed the
“essential holding” of Roe. 79 The controlling joint opinion in Casey states that
“[i]t is a promise of the Constitution that there is a realm of personal liberty which
the government may not enter” 80 and that “[o]ur law affords constitutional
protection to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception,
family relationships, child rearing, and education.” 81 The freedom to make
healthcare decisions arguably falls within the carapace that these various
decisional rights erect, and indeed the individual mandate requires consumers to
purchase insurance plans that provide coverage for “maternity and newborn care”
and “pediatric services.” 82 The mandate therefore affects an individual’s
allocation of financial resources to competing health care options; that allocation
decision is plausibly covered by the liberty interests articulated in Casey. That
language from Casey, moreover, was co-authored by Justice Kennedy, a
significant swing vote in the ACA litigation. To rely on a substantive due process
argument but to eschew reliance on the Court’s controlling abortion decision
would border on legal malpractice.
To be clear, none of the above is offered as psychoanalysis. I have no
special insight into the actual set of reasons that motivated the choice to rely on
federalism arguments and not to rely on substantive due process. It may suffice as
explanation to note that the choice was likely correct strategically, on which I
have more to say in Part III. And even if the lawyers, funders, and clients making
that choice were motivated by the kinds of political considerations I have
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discussed, cognitive dissonance may well have led them to experience their
decision-making process as free from such influences. At a minimum, however,
this Part demonstrates that, in the context of the ACA litigation, there were
substantial political obstacles to reliance on substantive due process. Whatever the
doctrinal benefits of doing so might have been, the strategic costs were likely
much higher.
III
The story Part II tells remains incomplete. It suggests a partial explanation
for the litigation choices of some prominent challengers to the individual mandate,
but it does not explain the responses of judges to the substantive due process
claims that have in fact been made. As discussed above, Judge Vinson ruled that
the individual mandate was unconstitutional but was quite skeptical of the
substantive due process argument. Judge Sutton referred to the due process
version of the plaintiff’s argument in the individual mandate challenge rejected by
the Sixth Circuit:
Why construe the Constitution . . . to place this limitation—that citizens
cannot be forced to buy insurance, vegetables, cars and so on—solely in a
grant of power to Congress, as opposed to due process limitations on
power with respect to all American legislative bodies? Few doubt that the
States may require individuals to buy medical insurance, and indeed at
least two of them have. The same goes for a related and familiar mandate
of the States—that most adults must purchase car insurance. Yet no court
has invalidated these kinds of mandates under the Due Process Clause or
any other liberty-based guarantee of the Constitution. That means one of
two things: either compelled purchases of medical insurance are different
from compelled purchases of other goods and services, or the States, even
under plaintiffs’ theory of the case, may compel purchases of insurance,
vegetables, cars and so on. Sometimes an intuition is just an intuition.83
Judge Sutton treats the absence of successful due process claims against the
individual mandate as evidence that such claims are inadequate. It may well be
that judges who have rejected the substantive due process argument have been
socialized into a political culture that, for the reasons stated in Part II, prioritizes
limits on federal power over aggrandizement of individual rights. That argument,
however, is speculative, vaguely paranoid, and happily unnecessary. The better
view links the doctrinal account of Part I with the socio-political account of Part II
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to arrive at a more complete picture of the legal status of economic due process
arguments. In brief, Lochner’s status as an anticanonical case, which results in
large measure from its compatibility with other rights-based claims, distorts
doctrinal arguments about economic rights.
Lochner is the dean of the anticanon. 84 No case is more consistently
associated labeled anticanonical by academics, 85 no repudiated case more
consistently receives significant treatment in leading constitutional law
casebooks;86 and no case is negatively cited more frequently in modern Supreme
Court opinions.87 As David Strauss says, “[y]ou have to reject Lochner if you
want to be in the mainstream of American constitutional law today.”88
A judicial decision does not acquire this unhappy status by happenstance.
Within the U.S. constitutional tradition, the few cases that become strongly
anticanonical are the detritus of regimes that succumbed to constitutional
revolutions. The Civil War and Reconstruction represent the repudiation of Dred
Scott v. Sandford; the New Deal settlement represents the repudiation of Lochner;
and the Second Reconstruction represents the repudiation of Plessy v. Ferguson.89
One of the functions of anticanonical discourse is to reconcile constitutional
continuity with the rejection of the traditions these cases represent. We persuade
ourselves that these cases were wrong the day they were decided so that we may
assure ourselves that we are not as one with a people committed to slavery, to
sweatshops, and to Jim Crow.90
Under the circumstances, it is not enough for someone arguing in favor of
a form of economic due process to dance around the unyielding Lochner
precedent. She must confront it directly, proactively, and successfully. The oral
argument in Florida v. Department of Health & Human Services was devoted
largely to articulating and debating a limiting principle to the federal
government’s assertion of regulatory power under the Commerce Clause. Had the
litigation instead focused on substantive due process, the argument (in the
unlikely event it made it to the Supreme Court) would instead have focused on
how the challengers’ claims differ from the claims accepted in Lochner. In fact,
Lochner made several appearances at the Supreme Court oral argument even
without any due process claim to speak of. Solicitor General Donald Verrilli
argued that “to embark on the kind of analysis that [the challengers] suggest the
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Court ought to embark on is to import Lochner-style substantive due process.”91
Later in the argument, Chief Justice Roberts said that “it would be going back to
Lochner if we were put in the position of saying, no, you can use your commerce
power to regulate insurance, but you can’t use your commerce power to regulate
this market in other ways.”92 And Justice Sotomayor asked Paul Clement, arguing
on behalf of the respondents, “Is this a Lochner era argument that only the States
can [require the purchase of insurance], even though it affects commerce?”93
Notice that each invocation of Lochner associated the case with a different
substantive proposition. The first tied Lochner to the notion that unenumerated
liberty interests limit governmental regulatory power; the second to the notion
that courts should import what deconstructionists call nested oppositions such as
activity/inactivity or direct/indirect into judicial review of federal power; the third
to the notion that the Tenth Amendment or its equivalent acts as an independent
limitation on otherwise valid exercises of federal authority. 94 None of these
propositions needs to be linked to Lochner and indeed the latter two align more
closely with cases like Hammer v. Dagenhart 95 and Carter v. Carter Coal, 96
which invalidated federal statutes. Moreover, notwithstanding their association
with Lochner, none of the three propositions is fully discredited. All of modern
substantive due process jurisprudence involves limitations that unenumerated
liberty interests place on regulatory power; the nested opposition of
economic/noneconomic has become a fixture of modern Commerce Clause case
law; and New York v. United States97 and United States v. Printz98 are difficult to
understand in the absence of an external limit on congressional power grounded in
federalism concerns.
Lochner, then, is the hardest working case in the U.S. Reports. It is both a
synecdoche and a rhetorical resource. Its unquestionably negative valence enables
it to stand in for—and thereby to attack—a very broad set of propositions, even
some that, in other contexts, are embedded within our constitutional tradition. One
such proposition is economic due process. Even if we can rather easily distinguish
statutory invalidation of a labor contract from statutory compulsion to enter into
an insurance contract, Lochner casts a shadow—a penumbra, if you will—over
the entire enterprise. It forces recalculation of the anticipated costs and benefits of
91
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advancing certain kinds of claims and therefore may strongly distort doctrinal
argument. Like an athletic seven-footer, Lochner alters even the shots that it
cannot block.
An irony bears mention. Lochner’s anticanonicity, its stickiness as a
negative precedent, both motivates and derives from its usefulness across the
ideological and doctrinal spectrum. Lochner became anticanonical in the late
1960s and early 1970s, not because advocates and judges suddenly discovered
that economic due process was a losing claim but rather because they discovered
that noneconomic due process was a winning one.99 Lochner is an instrument of
opposition, not affirmative argumentation, and so its effectiveness has expanded
in proportion to the numerosity of its potential targets. Griswold and its progeny
provided conservatives with reason to invoke Lochner as a negative precedent and
liberals, who had long embraced anti-Lochner rhetoric, continued to do so as a
means of distinguishing progressive due process arguments from conservative
ones. And so it is the conceptual generativity of due process arguments that
engenders Lochner’s anticanonicity. Lochner revisionism, rampant within the
legal academy and at conservative think tanks, may be better described as a
feature of Lochner’s anticanonical status than as a threat to it.
It remains to explain why Lochner does not effectively condemn
federalism arguments—the other claims the New Deal was thought to have
settled—even as many seek to call it to that service.100 The answer may be, in part,
that Griswold, and later Roe, have helped to fix the socio-legal meaning of
Lochner as a case about economic due process and unenumerated rights rather
than as a full-fledged stand-in for limitations on governmental regulatory
authority. Abortion rights cases give liberals strong reason to defend substantive
due process and therefore give conservatives strong reason to attack it. Economic
due process gives some conservatives strong reason to defend substantive due
process and so gives liberals strong reason to attack it. By contrast, one finds
strong critics of broad congressional power almost exclusively on the political
right, and so states’ rights arguments are not universally deployed. Federalism has
not found its Lochner because it has not found its Roe.
Conclusion
The force of the broccoli objection derives from its self-evident
incompatability with liberal democratic premises. And yet the logic of the ACA
challengers’ principal argument would suggest no constitutional infirmity in a
state-level mandate to purchase (and consume?) broccoli. There is no conceptual
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incongruity in the notion that we have rights that only states, and not the federal
government, may infringe. The right to a grand jury101 and to a civil jury trial102
are among those rights103 and we get along fine with that tension. Moreover, the
idea that the federal structure is not concerned with limitations on centralized
power for its own sake but rather for the sake of rights protection has a lengthy
and distinguished intellectual history.104
But there is little reason in principle to suppose that among the rights less
protected as against states than as against the federal government is the right to
refuse participation in an interstate commercial market. And if such a right is
among those the federal government has less leeway to infringe, then surely the
reason for that is grounded not in limitations inherent in Article I but in
independent limitations housed within the Bill of Rights. Putting principle aside,
there is still less justification in doctrine for the suggestion that neither the
Commerce Clause nor the Necessary and Proper Clause permits regulation of
self-insurance for medical costs but that the Fifth Amendment has nothing to say
about the matter.
The most persuasive explanation for this confusing mix of propositions
rests neither in principle nor in doctrine but rather in party politics and in our
socio-legal culture. A substantive due process attack on the individual mandate
would threaten Mitt Romney’s political prospects and Republican Party unity,
would associate conservatives with reproductive freedom precedents, and perhaps
as significantly, would place Lochner, rather than broccoli, at the center of the
legal argument. Yuck.
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